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The War With Mexico, Volume I (of 2) By Justin H. Smith Characters: 27687

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1. 76Arista, May 25, 29. 76To Mejía, May 27. (Monterey) 169Taylor to Crittenden, Oct. 9. Apuntes, 50–3. 76Mejía, June 9, 19; July 2. 76Id., proclam., July 6. The number of officers, each of whom required baggage and servants, was excessive. Arista eliminated more than half of them. The cavalry were afoot, and he took steps to remount them. Contracts were made for mules to draw the cannon, and the work of putting the artillery in order began. Owing to Mejía's illness, Requena assumed the actual command in June (Carre?o, Jefes, ccii).

2. Apuntes, 51, 53. 285Letter to Paredes, July 13. 285Segura to Escudero, June 4. Balbontín, Invasión, 26. 76Arista, Apr. 24. 76Mejía, June 9, 19, 20; July 19, 29; Aug. 19, 21. 76Id. to Baz, July 29. 76Ampudia, Aug. 28. 76Mejía to Ampudia, Aug. 31. 69Spy to Taylor, Apr. 5. In addition to their lack of patriotism, the people had no arms (76gov. N. León, May 24).

3. 69Vinton to Worth, Aug. 19. 285Mejía to Paredes, July 20. And from 76 the following. Mejía, June 14 ("The loss of the immense territory divided by the Sierra is inevitable"); July 9, 19; Aug. 10, 17, 21. Id. to Canales, Aug. 10. Gargollo to second alcalde of S. Fernando, June 5. S. Fernando ayunt. to gov. of Tamaulipas, June 8. Canales, June 18. Id. to Mejía, June 14; June 14, personal. Gov. of N. León, June 24.

Mejía reported that the officers at Monterey agreed to make no pronunciamiento and to obey the established authorities, whoever they might be; but a spy reported "utter confusion" in the public mind there (Vinton, supra) in consequence of the revolution of August 4, and Worth heard that a state of things existed which might have been taken advantage of by Taylor (69to Bliss, Aug. 27).

4. (Intended) June 24 Taylor wrote: "If the gov. think proper to entrust me with this command for the purpose of carrying the war into the enemies country I do not feel authorized to decline the same" (Letters (Bixby), 18). The context shows that Taylor then knew (p. 17) that he was to have the command. The orders to that effect had been issued June 8. In fact the orders of Jan. 13 directed Taylor to assume the offensive, should Mexico begin hostilities, and his report of Apr. 26 recommended operating beyond the Rio Grande (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 91, 141). All that he did and failed to do must therefore be viewed in the light of the fact that he knew, or should have known, that he ought to wage a vigorous and aggressive campaign. (Smuggling) Henry, Camp. Sketches, 19. The smuggling on this border was a familiar theme in the Mexican press. 76Arleji to Ampudia, Aug. 31 (some Mexicans are led by self-interest to serve the Americans more faithfully than they would serve their own country). 76Mejía (July 19) classed the people of the border generally as enemies. Taylor seems to have neglected persistently the duty of obtaining information (Niles, Sept. 12, p. 22; So. Qtrly. Rev., Nov., 1850, p. 457). Apparently he tried interrogating Mexicans here and there, and was disgusted to find their statements disagreed. What he should have had was, as Scott recommended (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 327) many carefully selected agents (spies), whose accounts could have been sifted by comparison. No evidence can be found that he even attempted to follow this advice, though Worth realized the value of information, and did something of real utility. Taylor's lack of data will appear later. Meade, who was in a position to be well-informed, wrote on Sept. 17 near Marín that the Americans knew no more of the numbers or defences at Monterey than when they were at Matamoros (Letters, i, 130). Ripley (War with Mexico, i, 156–60) endeavors to show that Scott interfered unwarrantably and caused confusion by giving Taylor instructions on June 12 that were at variance with those given by Marcy on June 8 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 323, 325). But (1) Marcy knew of and endorsed Scott's "interference" (ibid., p. 328); and (2) there was no practical variance. Marcy and Scott agreed that Taylor was to advance. Scott said Taylor would make the high road toward the capital one of his lines, which was (as Scott said) a matter "of course." Marcy said it had not been decided whether he should advance to the capital.

5. Polk, Diary, Sept. 5, 1846; Mar. 20, 1847. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 545 (Jesup). 76Gov. Tamaulipas, Aug. 5 (Taylor obtained 1000 mules through the alcalde of Reynosa). Upton, Military Policy, 215 (not known at Washington that wagons could be used). Taylor, Letter to Gaines. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 559, 565–6 (Jesup). Smith, Remins., 13–15. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 177–8. 61Worth to alcalde, Aug. 24. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 164. N. Y. Commerc. Advertiser, Mar. 29, 1847. May 21 Taylor wrote that the means of transportation might be pack-mules "chiefly" (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 300). (Taylor's plans not known) Sen. 1; 30, 1, 546 (Jesup). (Complained) 169Taylor to Crittenden, Sept. 1; 61to adj. gen., Sept. 10; Letter to Gaines; Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 557.

Wagons (drawn usually by eight mules) were more convenient, where they could be used, than pack-mules; but Santa Anna showed, six months later, that with no such wagons 24-pound cannon and an army three times as large as Taylor proposed to take could be moved about twice the distance from Camargo to Monterey by a route that passed through, not a populated region like that where Taylor was, but a virtual desert. Taylor not only knew that Arista had depended upon mules, but captured that general's entire outfit. It was easy to obtain large numbers of mules through the alcaldes. Experience proved that unbroken mules could be made fit for the work in three days (Smith, Remins., 18). The first call for wagons (May 18) proceeded from a quartermaster at Pt. Isabel, who called for seventy. There is no evidence that Taylor prompted this requisition, and it was wholly inadequate for his professed needs. His indifference about such matters was illustrated by Col. Cross, at the time his chief quartermaster, who said, "With respect to the means of transportation to be provided, or other preparations in my branch of the service, I have never received a line of instructions or any order whatever from Gen. Taylor" (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 650). It was his duty to call seasonably for the desired number of wagons, and he did not do it.

When the department found that wagons were wanted, it displayed much energy in having them purchased or built (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 546–764). In fact, on an intimation from Scott (May 15), it ordered 200 to be constructed at Philadelphia as soon as they could be thoroughly made, and eleven days later sent an agent to Cincinnati for 300 more. Later the field of operations extended as far as Boston. But much time was required to find suitable lumber and skilled workmen, build the wagons properly, and transport them to Mexico. None reached the front in time for the fall campaign; and indeed, after they arrived, pack-mules continued to be used (Whiting: Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 688). Taylor complained particularly (Bixby collection, 185) because 100–150 wagons intended for him went to Wool, whose expedition will be described in chap. xiii; but Wool was under Taylor's orders, and the latter neglected to regulate the matter, while the former was alert and active. Taylor complained also of lacking mules, harness, pack-saddles, horseshoe nails, etc.; but, as in the cases of boats and wagons, the fault seems chargeable to the head of the army. He conceived the absurd idea that the government was endeavoring to ruin him by crippling his operations, as if success had not been fully as important for the government as for him. Worth privately said that any lack of transportation was chargeable to Taylor, and described the General's complaints as intended to ward off responsibility in case of failure and augment glory in case of success (364to Capt. S., Sept. 5); and on the maturest consideration this judgment appears to be substantially correct. For a statement of the chief clerk, quartermaster's office, Washington, see chap. x, note 13. The practical conclusion is that Taylor, with nearly 300 wagons and numberless mules at command, was able to move with reasonable promptness. Jesup, after reaching the scene, contracted for 2000 mules in one day, and said that Taylor might have collected 10,000 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 567).

One must be extremely cautious about asserting what a general might have done; but it seems quite clear that Taylor could and should have organized a systematic spy service that would have given him adequate information regarding the Mexican army and the defences of Monterey; have advanced his regulars, about 1000 at least of his best volunteers, a large supply of provisions, at least six 18-pounders, entrenching tools, etc. to Camargo in June; have had at least 3000 mules collected there by August 1; have placed, say, 2000 regulars and 1000 volunteers at Cerralvo by Aug. 15, and gathered the large stocks of subsistence available in that district; and have reached Monterey with 9000 men, heavy guns and ample supplies by Sept. 15. Or Taylor might have gone to Saltillo via Monclova. The distance would have been considerably greater, but the Mexicans would have had to abandon Monterey and Rinconada Pass, and Taylor and Wool would have been able to co?perate. Both Santa Anna and Mejía feared he would adopt this plan. In reply to all this it may be said that on pp. 198–9 the author mentioned without disapproval Scott's plan to begin the campaign about Sept. 25. But the two cases were not parallel. Taylor was already in the "hot mud" and needed to bestir himself; and he planned but a small movement, whereas Scott, not yet in touch with the conditions, planned a large and decisive one, which probably would not have advanced via Monterey.

6. (Knew) Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 46, 51, 177; N. Y. Herald, July 25; Niles, July 18, p. 309; Scott, Mems., ii, 391–2; Cong. Globe, 29, 2, app., 125 (Ingersoll). A resolution was introduced in Congress asking the reason for the inactivity of the army (Niles, July 18, p. 309). One newspaper called Taylor "Gen. Delay." (Sustain) Taylor, Letter to Gaines. (Consequences) Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 46. (Suspected) Taylor, ibid., 13, 20. (Resistance) Taylor to Crittenden, Sept. 1 ("I hope to be in possession of Monterey and Saltillo, as soon as our legs can carry us there"); Bliss, Aug. 14, in Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 411 (Taylor "anticipates no serious difficulty in reaching and occupying Saltillo"); 135Taylor to Butler, Aug. 26; Hist. Mag., x, 207–8 (Backus); 180Pillow to wife, Aug. 16 (Taylor says he does not think we shall have to fire another gun in all northern Mexico). Robertson, Remins., 125.

It has been said that Taylor knew of Polk's negotiations with Santa Anna, and therefore had good reason to expect no resistance. But this was a matter for his government to act upon, and the government had said nothing of that kind to him. As we shall see, Scott, although negotiating himself later with Santa Anna, did not relax his military activity in the least. This was the only proper course for a general in the field under orders to press the war. 185Aug. 5 Worth ordered Duncan to make a thorough examination of the routes. Aug. 8 Duncan reported that the Mexicans were said to be fortifying Monterey. Sept. 3 Taylor wrote (Bixby coll., 51): "The country ... shall not be disappointed; even if it should turn out to be a disaster." One does not readily see how Taylor could have supposed that the government wished to be, or was likely to be, supported by an admittedly inadequate expedition.

7. 61Ordnance bureau, memo., June 15. See pp. 148, 164, 177. Benet, Ordnance Reports, 1880, ii, 158. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 329, 417 (Taylor). For S. Anna's task see note 5 and chap. xix. 66Sanders to Taylor, Feb. 15. 61Ridgely to adj. gen., Aug. 2. (Bayonet) Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 178.

8. Robertson, Remins., 118. 69Vinton to Worth, Aug. 19. 69Wolf to Bliss, Aug. 10. 69Duncan to Worth, Aug. 8. 65Taylor, gen. orders 98–9, 105, 108, 110. 76Canales to Mejía, Aug. 20. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 411–2, 417 (Taylor), 534 (spec. orders 119). 76Aldrete to Mejía, Aug. 30. Picayune, Aug. 25. Meade, Letters, i, 123. Niles, Sept. 5, p. 2. 69P. F. Smith, memoir, Oct. 14. Rowles, Allen, 93. U. S. Military maps (War College, Washington). Duncan and also Hays explored the routes.

The army was organized as follows: Regulars (mostly). A battery of two 24-pound howitzers and a 10-inch mortar (100 men) from the First Artillery. First Division (Brig. Gen. Twiggs). Cavalry: Second Dragoons. Ridgely's battery. Third Brigade (Lieut. Col. Garland): Bragg's battery, Third and Fourth Infantry, Capt. Shiver's volunteer company. Fourth Brigade (Lieut. Col. Wilson): First Infantry, Washington and Baltimore battalion. Second Division (Brevet Brig. Gen. Worth). First Brigade (Lieut. Col. Staniford): Duncan's battery, Artillery Battalion, Eighth Infantry. Second Brigade ([G]Brig. Gen. P. F. Smith): Taylor's (Mackall's) battery, Fifth and Seventh Infantry, Blanchard's Louisiana volunteer company. Volunteers. Field Division (Maj. Gen. Butler). First Brigade (Brig. Gen. Hamer): First Kentucky and First Ohio regiments. Second Brigade (Brig. Gen. Quitman): First Tennessee and First Mississippi regiments (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 417). Each of these four regiments was reduced to a strength of about 500 privates by leaving behind the physically unfit. Sept. 20, the numbers were respectively (aside from 43 sick) 482, 524, 459, 452; also 37 artillery. Texas Division (Maj. Gen. Henderson) First and Second regiments of mounted volunteers. These and the First Mississippi were riflemen. About Aug. 13 a regiment of Texas riflemen commanded by Albert Sidney Johnston decided (except some who formed a company under Shiver) to go home. Johnston was soon att

ached to Butler's staff as acting inspector general (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 536). "Field Division" simply meant those volunteers (except Texans) selected to make the present campaign. It was a temporary and local organization. Sept. 11 Meade (Letters, i, 126) analyzed the army as follows: 8 regiments of regular infantry (2500); 4 regiments of volunteer infantry (2000); 4 light batteries, each of 4 6-pounders (280); one heavy battery (100); 2 squadrons of regular cavalry (200); one squadron of volunteer cavalry (150); 2 regiments of volunteer cavalry (1000); total, 6230 men and 4–500 teamsters, hospital attendants, etc., mostly armed. Aug. 15 a man from Monterey said Taylor should not move against the city without 12,000 well disciplined men. For the assignment of wagons and pack-mules to the various corps see Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 501.

A pack-mule (mula de carga) was expected to carry 300 pounds. Not a little skill was required to load the animal quickly in such a manner that its burden would be secure and would not chafe; but the Mexican mule-driver was a master of the art. The subject is rather interesting. One may consult Inman, Old S. Fe Trail (1897), 56–8; Robertson, Remins., 269; Picayune, Mar. 6, 1847 (Hughes); Robertson, Visit, i, 274; Claiborne, Quitman, i, 279 (Holt); Henshaw narrative. The troops not taken to Monterey were probably distributed about as follows: at Camargo, 2100 under Brig. Gens. Pillow and Marshall; at Matamoros, 1100 under Col. Clarke; below that city on the Rio Grande, 4500; at Pt. Isabel, 120 under Maj. Gardner; in hospitals, 1400. Maj. Gen. Patterson commanded all these forces.

9. Henshaw narrative. Claiborne, Quitman, ii, 306 (Taylor). Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 56. Robertson, Remins., 119–22. 69P. F. Smith to Bliss, Aug. 26. 69Worth to Bliss, Aug. 25. 148Chamberlain, recolls. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 679 (Whiting). Giddings, Sketches, 108. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 161–77.

10. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 54, 56. Robertson, Remins., 122. Velasco, Geografía, iv, 121. 69Duncan to Worth, Aug. 8. 69Worth to Bliss, Aug. 25. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 419 (Worth), 421 (Taylor). Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., ii, 281. 76Arleji to Ampudia, Aug. 31. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 154, 177–9. Grant, Mems., i, 107. Picayune, Sept. 22; Oct. 6. Meade, Letters, i, 124. Kenly, Md. Vol., 85. Metrop. Mag., Dec, 1907, p. 316.

Worth wrote on Sept. 3 that he could have bought 5000 bushels of corn here (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 420). Taylor stated that he found beef, goats, sheep and corn in abundance at Cerralvo (180Pillow to wife, Sept. 20). These facts bear upon Taylor's complaint that the government's failure to send wagons caused a shortage of provisions and therefore of men, especially since the wagons used for the transportation of water as far as Cerralvo were no longer required for that service (65gen. orders. 115). On learning of the corn Taylor might, so far as concerned subsistence, have brought on another volunteer brigade. One cannot see why he did not push some troops on to Cerralvo instead of letting them die at Camargo. One soldier wrote in his diary that there were unwholesome swamps at Cerralvo, but the statement appears doubtful. Worth's command remained at this point nearly three weeks and was still in excellent health. If there were swamps, the camps could no doubt have been pitched on ground above them, for a fine stream came from a gorge in the mountain.

11. Balbontín, Invasión, 10–24. Apuntes, 54. Negrete, Invasión, ii, 304–5. 93Memoranda. Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec., 1846. And from 76 the following. To Ramírez, Aug. 17. Comte. gen. S. L. P., Aug. 15, 28; Sept. 2, 16. Ramírez, Aug. 17. Galindo, Aug. 24. Mejía, Aug. 17, 19. Romero, Aug. 24. To Ampudia, Aug. 17. Ampudia, Aug. 26; Sept. 2, 3, 9. Ponce de León, Sept. 19, 22. Id. to Ampudia, Sept. 15. Mejía to Ampudia, Aug. 31. Returns, Sept. 10, 11. Pacheco, Aug. 25. Ampudia reported that the First Brigade made about forty-eight miles one day. This statement, were it not supported by similar facts, would not be believed. The Fourth Brigade marched for Monterey, but did not arrive. It was very poorly equipped. It reached S. L. Potosí Aug. 29, was halted there to maintain order, and did not leave until Sept. 22.

Ampudia organized his infantry as four brigades under Gen. Ramírez, Gen. Mejía, Col. Uraga, and Col. Mendoza, and his cavalry as two brigades under Gens. Torrejón and Romero, the former commanding by right of seniority all the mounted troops. The name of the se?orita might excite suspicion, but there were others who bore it.

The Mexican archives give very few complete, properly attested returns, but we have one here, and it seems worth while to summarize it in order to show the fragmentary character of the Mexican armies. The attached numbers are the rank and file. Staff; a section of engineers; do. of Plana Mayor; do. of surgeons, 10; sappers, 118; artillery, 211. Infantry: Second Ligero regt., 220; Third do., 512; Fourth do., 397; First Line regt., 186; Third do., 345; Fourth do., 187; detachments of Sixth and Eighth do., 89; Seventh do., 129; Activo Battalion (First) of Mexico, 136; Do. of Morelia, 77; Do. of S. L. Potosí, 340; Do. of Querétaro, 340; Do. of Aguascalientes, 383; Auxiliary battalion of Monterey, 349. Cavalry: Ligero, 80; First Line, 93; Third do., 140; Eighth do., 99; Jalisco Lancers, 146; Activo of Guanajuato, 132; Do. of S. L. Potosí, 123; Auxiliary Squadron of Béjar, 68; First Permanent Co. of Tamaulipas, 41; Second do., 9; Permanent Co. of Lampazos, 23; Do. of Béjar, 22; Do. of La Bahía, 1; First Activo Co. of N. León, 56; Defensores [militia] of N. León, 625. Total, 5836. This was duly signed by Ampudia and J. G. Conde. A party of deserters (mostly Irish) from the American army, which served at Monterey, was presumably included in the above return. They became the nucleus of the "San Patricio" corps.

12. From 76 the following. To Ampudia, Aug. 20, 23, 24, 28 (four despatches), 31. Comte. gen. N. León, Aug. 26. S. Anna, Sept. 29. Aug. 24 Ampudia was told to have Mejía suspend his retreat, unless Taylor had advanced in full force. Aug. 28 he was ordered to destroy the fortifications and retire, leaving a strong body of cavalry to screen Monterey and observe the Americans until the latter should arrive within a few leagues of the town. Aug. 31 Ampudia's decision to hold the city was endorsed. Evidently the minister of war did not agree with Santa Anna, and on finding an excuse disregarded the latter's advice. The comandante general was especially anxious to have the Americans attacked during their march. He described the garrison as enthusiastic.

13. From 76Mejía to Ampudia, Aug. 31. Comte. gen. N. León, Aug. 26. Ampudia to Mejía, Aug. 24, 26. Ampudia, Aug. 26; Sept. 9. To Ampudia, Aug. 31.

Ampudia's reasons were: 1. It would take a month to demolish the fortifications, and during that time the enemy could attack on advantageous terms; 2. The matériel could not be saved; 3. The abandonment of Monterey would lead the people to declare their independence and unite with Taylor, enabling him to hold the mountains so strongly that 50,000 men could not dislodge him; 4. Public opinion would blame Ampudia and the government; 5. The effect on the morale of all the troops concerned in the affair would be fatal. His plan was to attack the Americans in detail on their march; and then, should he find them too strong for him, retreat with his artillery and infantry, leaving the cavalry to fight rear-guard actions.

14. Apuntes, 54. From 76 the following. To Mejía, May 27. Mejía, June 19 (two despatches); July 25. Comte. gen. N. León, Aug. 12. Ampudia, Sept. 9. Mejía to Ampudia, Aug. 31.

15. 307Roberts, diary, Nov. 27. Meade, Letters, i, 133, 136. Richmond Enquirer, Oct. 20. 169Taylor to Crittenden, Oct. 9. Henshaw narrative. Apuntes, 53–4; 176Davis to Brown, Sept. 20. Balbontín, Invasión, 24. 92Map and plan of defence. Negrete, Invasión, ii, 327 (Ampudia). Picayune, Nov. 4. Eyewitness, Complete History, 45. Numerous maps, published and in MS.

16. Apuntes, 53–4. Meade, Letters, i, 138 (evidently in error about the citadel garrison). Picayune, Oct. 21. Nat. Intelligencer, Nov. 20. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 216. Henshaw narrative. Robertson, Remins., 126–8. 69Mansfield, report. 66Id. to Totten, June 30, 1847. 147Chamberlain, diary. Balbontín, Invasión, 43. 76Comte. gen. N. León, Sept. 20. 76Ampudia, Sept. 9. The Americans often spoke of the citadel as the "Black Fort" or the "Old Colored Gentleman." Its Mexican name was Fort Independencia, but it must not be confounded with the redoubt on Independence Hill. It stood about 1000 yards from the densely-built part of the city.

17. 69Mansfield, report. Balbontín, Invasión, 27, 38, 42. 76Mejía to Ampudia, Aug. 31. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 424 (Taylor). 364Worth to -–, Oct. 2. Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 46 (Marcy, report). 221Hill, diary. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 217.

18. From 76. S. Anna to Ampudia, Aug. 13. Ampudia to Gov. Tamaulipas, Aug. 23. Relaciones (to Guerra), Sept. 23. Ampudia, Aug. 28. To Ampudia, Sept. 4. Mejía to Ampudia, Aug. 31.

19. Diario, July 4; Sept. 21. Monitor Repub., Sept. 25. Reid, Scouting Expeds., 120. Picayune, Sept. 22. Negrete, Invasión, ii, 326. N. Orl. Commerc. Bulletin, Sept. 22. 76Ampudia, proc., Aug. 31. 76Proc. in English, Sept. 15. 76Circular, Sept. 15.

20. Monitor Repub., Sept. 18; Oct. 29 (Jáuregui). 13Bankhead, no. 155, 1846. Apuntes, 54, 57. Balbontín, Invasión, 26. 76Nevia to Ampudia, Aug. 26.

21. Tampico Eco, Sept. 24. Gov. of Tamaulipas, Aug. 20. Rose, McCulloch, 73. Mejía to Paredes, July 20. Balbontín, Invasión, 26. Apuntes, 55–8. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 526 (spec. orders 129). And from 76 the following. Ampudia, Aug. 31; Sept. 2, res., 15, res. Id. to Torrejón, Sept. 1. Mejía to Ampudia, Aug. 31. Canales, Aug. 30. Id. to Ampudia, Aug. 30–1. Mejía to comte. gen. S. L. P., Aug. 17.

Canales said in substance: The spare horses of the enemy cannot be taken, for they are not turned loose; the roads cannot be broken up, for they run across stony plains; the woods cannot be fired, for no great fields of dry grass are near them; the watering places cannot be made useless, for they are streams coming from the mountains; the wagons and pack-mules cannot be captured, for my horses are unserviceable.

22. Meade, Letters, i, 129. 147Chamberlain, diary. Giddings, Sketches, 97. 139W. B. to D. Campbell, Aug. 28. Nebel and Kendall, 5. Mayer, Mex. War, 159–61. Picayune, Nov. 13. 65Gen. orders 115. Smith, Chile con Carne, 94, note. Accounts of the costumes naturally varied.

23. Picayune, Oct. 6. Greensborough Morn. Post, Apr. 5, 1903. 349Patridge to Miss W., July 21, 1847. Metrop. Mag., Dec., 1907, 316–7. Spirit of the Times, Oct. 14. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 183–6, 244. 364Worth to S., Sept. 16. McCall, Letters, 470. Reid, Scouting Expeds., 128. 190Ewing, diary, Nov. 18. Robertson, Remins., 123–4. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 57. 69Duncan to Worth, Aug. 8. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 421–2 (Taylor).

One small mountain in this region had a bare side composed of crystallized sulphate of lime. Here, as generally, the author draws upon his own observations of Mexican scenery. There were a number of defiles between Cerralvo and Monterey and a great deal of rough, bushy country, where the Mexicans could have made Taylor no little trouble. In all probability he could have been delayed five to seven days. See Monitor Repub., Oct. 20, remitido.

24. 169Taylor to Crittenden, Oct. 9. Id., Letters (Bixby), 57, 59. Henshaw narrative. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 277. Robertson, Remins., 125–6. 65Taylor, gen. orders 119–20. Apuntes, 54, 58. Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., ii, 288. 76Comte. gen. N. León, Sept. 20. Reid, Scouting Expeds., 142. Picayune, Oct. 6. Rose, McCulloch, 100. Niles, Oct. 17, p. 103. 244Chandler to Lakin, Nov. 23. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 189–91.

Wilhelm, who wrote the history of Worth's old regt. and had the use of Worth's papers, states that, after arriving at Marín, Taylor was "firm" in the opinion that he would meet with no serious resistance at Monterey. Certainly he then estimated Ampudia's regulars at only about 3000 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 422).

25. 169Taylor to Crittenden, Sept. 15, 1847. Id., Letter to Gaines. Id., Letters (Bixby), 178. Thorpe, Our Army at Monterey, 46. Robertson, Remins., 124. Henshaw narrative. French, Two Wars, 67. Apuntes, 58. Chávez, July 29, 1848. 76Ampudia, Sept. 19. Monitor Repub., Oct. 20. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 190–2.

Taylor's 61field return, Sept. 21 (the first of two numbers represents officers): Hdqtrs. and staff, 22; 23. Webster's battery (24-lb. howitzers), 3; 24. 1st Div. Hdqtrs. and staff, 3; 10. Ridgely's batt., 3; 75. 2 Drags. (4 Cos.), 10; 228. Bragg's batt., 2; 64. 3 Inf. (6 Cos.), 18; 284. 4 Inf. (6 Cos.), 16; 287. Shiver's Co., 3; 55. 1 Inf. (4 Cos.), 12; 179. Balt. and Wash. Battal. (6 Cos.), 20; 314. 2d Div. (see below), 93; 1558. Field Div. (see below), 148; 1781. Tex. Div. Hdqtrs. and staff, 5 offs. 1st Regt. (10 Cos.), 32; 376. 2d Regt. (10 Cos.), 35; 527. Surgeons, 5. Sick, 3; 143. 2d Div. (Sept. 17). Staffs, 5. 1st brig.: Duncan's batt., 68; Artill. Battal., 532; 8 Inf., 331. 2d brig.: Mackall's batt., 70; 5 Inf., 280; 7 Inf., 282; Blanchard's Co., 83. (These figures include 88 com. offs.) Sick, 7; 45. 5 Inf., 7 Inf. and 8 Inf. had 6 Cos. each. Art. Battal. had 9 Cos. Field Div. (Sept. 20). Staff, 12. Artill., 37. Ky. (10 Cos.), 482; Ohio (10 Cos.), 524; Miss. (8 Cos.), 452; Tenn. (10 Cos.), 459. (These figures include 139 com. offs.) Sick, 1; 42. Grand totals (Sept. 21), 425; 5795 = 6220.

Taylor's formal report counted the officers twice. Ripley made the same mistake (War with Mexico, i, 199). The 24-lb. howitzers appear to have been classed as heavy field guns (69memo., ordnance office, June 15).

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